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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that there are important spillovers as-
sociated with the operations of multinational enterprises. Spillovers
may occur when less advanced, local …rms learn from their more ad-
vanced, foreign competitors. But less advanced …rms may also actively
seek knowledge by investing abroad, so-called ”technology sourcing”
FDI. The present paper focuses on entry strategies in the presence
of technological di¤erences and spillovers. The main result is that
the technological leader may choose to invest in the foreign market in
order to prevent technology sourcing FDI from its less advanced rival.
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1 Introduction
The literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) suggests that technolog-
ical spillovers are, at least potentially, signi…cant.1 In addition, Audretsch
and Feldman (1996), Bransetter (2001), and Keller (2001) report that such
spillovers are primarily local in nature, i.e., intranational, rather than in-
ternational. Typical channels for spillovers include backward and forward
linkages between foreign a¢liates and local …rms, ”demonstration e¤ects”,
and labor turnover. An important question in the literature on FDI and
spillovers is how these spillovers a¤ect a …rm’s entry choice into a foreign
market.
The existing literature o¤ers two vehicles through which spillovers can
a¤ect a …rm’s entry decision.2 First, spillovers increase the competitiveness
of less advanced rivals. Thus, technological leaders have an incentive to
reduce spillovers in order to maintain their competitive advantage. One way
to reduce spillovers is not to invest in the foreign country, but rather to
service foreign demand through exports.3 By exporting, …rms can penetrate
a foreign market without locating close to their less advanced rivals, thereby
minimizing local spillovers. In this case, spillovers reduce the proximity gains
that high-tech …rms receive when they invest in the foreign market and, thus,
make FDI less attractive for technological leaders.
Second, if spillovers are local, technologically less advanced …rms have
an incentive to actively seek these spillovers by locating close to the head-
quarters and production facilities of their more advanced competitors. Such
investment is called ”technology acquisition” or ”technology sourcing” FDI.
Kogut and Chang (1991), Pugel, Kragas and Kimura (1996), Neven and
Siotis (1996), and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001)
provide empirical evidence for this motive.
In this paper we show that while spillovers can indeed reduce the tra-
ditional proximity gains of FDI, they can also create a strategic incentive
for investment by the technological leader. Our paper is most closely re-
1For a survey, see Blomström and Kokko (1998).
2Analyses of entry choice in the presence of spillovers include Ethier (1984), Ethier and
Markusen (1996), Fosfuri and Motta (1999), Siotis (1999), Fosfuri (2000), Fosfuri, Motta
and Rønde (2001), and Markusen (2001).
3Other strategies to reduce spillovers include the use of older, and less advanced vintages
of the technology, higher wages in order to reduce labor turnover, or the use of fully owned
subsidiaries rather than licensing agreements.
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lated to Fosfuri and Motta (1999), who consider the possibility of capturing
spillovers both at home and abroad. They demonstrate that spillovers may
induce a technologically less advanced …rm to undertake technology sourcing
FDI. While their paper focuses on the entry choice of the less advanced …rm,
our paper emphasizes the strategies of the high-tech …rm. We demonstrate
that the more advanced …rm has an incentive to prevent technology sourcing
FDI from its less advanced rival, and that one way of doing this is to invest
in the rival’s home market. Moreover, while the proximity-concentration
trade-o¤ approach (Brainard, 1993 and 1997) predicts that the pro…tability
of FDI is increasing in the level of trade costs relative to …xed investment
costs, we demonstrate that this is not necessarily the case when we allow for
technology sourcing FDI and strategic FDI.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and out-
lines the basic mechanisms that drive our results. The equilibrium analysis
is conducted in section 3. We examine several scenarios in order to show in
how far the results depend on the various speci…cations of the model. Section
4 concludes.
2 The model
The basic setup of the model is based on Horstmann and Markusen (1992).
There are two countries, A and B. Initially, i.e., prior to international invest-
ment, there is one …rm in each country, a and b, respectively. Prohibitively
high …xed costs on the corporate level prevent further …rms from entering
the market, so that the number of …rms is …xed. The …rms produce a ho-
mogenous good, Q, the demand for which is identical in both countries and
given by
pK = 1 ¡ (QaK + QbK) , (1)
where pK is the market price in countryK = A;B andQiK is the supplied
quantity of …rm i = a; b in this market. The two markets are completely
separable. Competition between the two …rms is of Nash-Cournot type.
Equilibrium operating pro…ts for …rm i on its sales in country K are given
by
¼iK =
1
9
(1¡ 2siK + sjK)2 , i 6= j; (2)
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where siK denotes …rm i’s marginal sales costs in market K . Cost func-
tions are assumed to be linear. There are two ways of serving a foreign
market, exports and FDI (green…eld investment). Marginal sales costs for
…rm i exporting to K are siK = ciJ + t, where ciJ is …rm i’s marginal pro-
duction costs operating from market J 6= K, and t denotes per unit trade
costs. Marginal sales costs given green…eld investment in K are denoted by
ciK, but in addition, this entry mode requires a …xed cost F .
The sequence of moves is as follows. At stage one, …rms choose whether or
not to invest in the foreign market. We consider both the case of simultaneous
moves and, allowing for strategic investment, sequential moves, with the high-
tech …rm moving …rst. At stage two, production and sales take place, with
the two …rms choosing quantity supplied simultaneously.
Firms di¤er with respect to technology. Assume that, initially, …rm a
is more advanced than b, so that the high-tech …rm a has lower marginal
production costs than its low-tech competitor b. Let the initial technology
gap between the two …rms, as captured by the di¤erence in their marginal
production costs, be given by c. We simplify by assuming that the marginal
production costs of the high-tech …rm are equal to zero, caA = 0, so that
the technology gap is de…ned by the initial marginal production costs of the
low-tech …rm b’s plant in market B.
The technology gap can be reduced through spillovers. In line with the
empirical literature, we assume that spillovers take place locally. If located
in the same country, a low-tech plant may learn from a high-tech plant,
resulting in a reduction of c. The degree to which the low-tech plant is able
to imitate the technology of the high-tech plant is given by ¸ 2 [0; 1], which
we assume is identical in both markets. If ¸ = 0, no spillovers take place,
whereas ¸ = 1 denotes the case of full spillovers, when the low-tech plant is
able to imitate the advanced technology completely. In either case, …rm b’s
marginal production costs after spillovers are given by (1 ¡¸)c.
Moreover, if a …rm has plants in both locations, learning in one location
may be applied to a plant in the other location. We shall refer to this as
the mobility of technology. Let the degree to which technology is mobile be
given by ¹ 2 [0; 1], where ¹ = 0 represents the case when none of the acquired
technology can be transferred to another plant in another location, and ¹ = 1,
when all spillovers are fully transferable. We assume instantaneous learning,
so that all spillovers have materialized as the production stage of the game
starts.
Tables 1 and 2 show the post-spillover marginal sales costs of the two
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…rms in country A and B, respectively. The …rst entry in each cell refers to
the marginal sales cost of …rm a and the second to that of …rm b.
Table 1. Marginal Sales Costs in Country A
anb Exports Investment
Exports 0; c+ t 0; (1¡ ¸) c
Investment 0; (1¡ ¸) c+ t 0; (1¡ ¸) c
Table 2. Marginal Sales Costs in Country B
anb Exports Investment
Export t; c t; min [¹ (1¡ ¸) c+ (1¡ ¹) c; (1¡ ¸) c+ t]
Investment 0; (1¡ ¸) c 0; (1¡ ¸) c
Firm a’s sales costs are straightforward. In its home market A, sa is
always zero. In the foreign market B, sa is zero if it invests and t if it
exports. Firm b’s marginal sales costs are more complicated since they are
a¤ected by spillovers, which in turn depend on location. If both …rms export,
there are no spillovers and sb is simply c in its home market B and c + t in
A. If both …rms invest, …rm b is exposed to the same technology in both of
its plants, and hence sbA = sbB = (1¡ ¸) c. If a invests in B and b exports
to A, sbA = (1 ¡ ¸) c+ t and sbB = (1¡ ¸) c.
Finally, if a exports to B and b invests in A, marginal production costs
of …rm b’s plant in A are given by sbA = (1¡ ¸)c. A share ¹ of the spillovers
¸c captured in country A can be transferred back to its plant in country B,
implying that sbB = ¹ (1¡ ¸) c+ (1¡ ¹)c = c¡ ¹¸c. Clearly, if ¹ = 1 both
plants will operate with marginal costs equal to (1 ¡ ¸)c, whereas if ¹ = 0
…rm b’s plant at home will be less advanced, operating with its initial pro-
duction costs c. However, transferring the newly acquired technology from
A to B is only one option. Another option is transporting goods from A
to B. Note that for ¹ < 1, learning implies that b’s foreign plant will be
more e¢cient than its home plant. If its marginal sales costs of supplying
B from its foreign plant, given by (1¡ ¸) c + t, are smaller than those of
local production in B, i.e., when transportation costs are su¢ciently small
so that t < (1 ¡¹) ¸c, then all production by …rm b will take place in its
plant in country A. This implies that b services its initial home market
from abroad. We will refer to this as the relocation case. Whether …rm b
chooses to transfer technology or goods depends on which of the two alter-
natives is less costly, so that marginal sales costs in this case are given by
min [¹ (1¡ ¸) c+ (1¡ ¹)c; (1 ¡ ¸)c + t].
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Table 1 sheds light on three central mechanisms in our paper. First,
technological spillovers strengthen the incentive of …rm b to invest in A.
Consider the case when …rm a is an exporter. By investing inA, …rm b reduces
its marginal sales costs in A by t+ ¸c relative to exports. The …rst term, t,
is the traditional proximity gain and the second term, ¸c, is the additional
gains from spillovers. Second, technology sourcing by the low-tech …rm is
costly for the high-tech …rm. The reason is simply that technology sourcing
implies the local presence of the low-tech …rm in the high-tech …rm’s home
market. And equation (2) shows that a …rm’s operating pro…ts are increasing
in the marginal sales costs of its rival. One implication of this is that, c.p.,
…rms wish to have their rival at a distance from their home markets, i.e., as
exporters rather than as investors. Third, the high-tech …rm may be able to
prevent technology sourcing by investing in the home country of the low-tech
…rm, which we shall refer to as strategic investment, or strategic FDI. To see
this, note that if a chooses FDI, …rm b can reduce its marginal sales costs
by t by also undertaking FDI. However, this is less than the marginal costs
savings of t + ¸c that b gets from FDI when a is an exporter. Hence, by
investing in B, …rm a reduces the incentive for b to choose FDI.
3 Analysis
While Tables 1 and 2 reveal some mechanisms, one cannot of course derive
from them the exact conditions under which strategic FDI is possible and
pro…table. This depends on the exogenous variables F; t; c; ¸ and ¹.
We organize the analysis into various scenarios. In order to limit the
number of possible cases, we …x F at a given level
¡
F = 112
¢
. The traditional
proximity-concentration trade-o¤ is well understood and is captured in our
analysis by varying t. In addition, in Scenarios 1-3 we consider extreme cases
of technological spillovers and mobility, with ¸ and ¹ taking values of either
zero or one, and we focus on the way in which the equilibrium outcome
depends on the the initial technology gap c. Scenario 4 analyzes the role
of spillovers ¸. Table 3 summarizes the di¤erent assumptions on variable
values in the four scenarios. An alphabetical entry indicates that we carry
out comparative static analysis on this variable, so that its value varies.
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Table 3. The scenarios
¹ ¸ c
Scenario 1: 0 0 c
Scenario 2: 0 1 c
Scenario 3: 1 1 c
Scenario 4: 1 ¸ 15
The payo¤s and the derivation of the various equilibrium market struc-
tures are shown in the appendix. We discuss the equilibrium outcomes by
use of …gures, one for each scenario. In the following, let (S; S) denote equi-
librium foreign entry mode of the two …rms, a and b respectively, where
S 2 fI;X; 0g, where I denotes FDI, X denotes exports, and 0 denotes no
market entry.
3.1 Scenario 1. The no-spillover case
Let us start with a very simple benchmark case that highlights the traditional
proximity-concentration trade-o¤ arguments in the presence of technological
di¤erences between …rms. If there are no spillovers (¸ = 0), …rms choose FDI
only if it is pro…table to do so from a trade cost or tari¤ jumping perspective.
This means that both …rms are more likely to set up a foreign plant if trade
costs are high. But trade costs are not the only determinant. Firms’ choices
also depend on the initial technology gap c. If c is high, the high-tech …rm
can capture a large market share in the foreign market, which makes it more
likely to choose FDI. Similarly, the low-tech …rm’s market share in its foreign
market is inversely related to its technological disadvantage, so that a high
c makes the low-tech …rm less likely to choose FDI. Figure 1 shows the
equilibrium market outcomes for various constellations of t and c.
The ii-curve indicates parameter values of t and c where the high-tech
…rm a is indi¤erent between exporting and FDI when the low-tech …rm b is
an exporter. Similarly, the low-tech …rm b is indi¤erent between exporting
and FDI along the iii-curve, given that …rm a has chosen investment. To the
right of the x-line, the combination of high marginal costs and high trade
costs is such that it is not pro…table for b to service the foreign market at
all. We see that if there are no technological di¤erences (c = 0), both …rms
export if t < 0:25 and invest if t > 0:25. As c increases, the low-tech …rm
is less inclined to set up a foreign plant because of the smaller market share
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Figure 1: Scenario 1
associated with a technological disadvantage, whereas the pro…tability of FDI
increases for the high-tech …rm.
A region of parameter values appears, given by the ”triangle” between
the three curves, where the equilibrium market structure is (I;X), i.e., FDI
by the high-tech …rm and exports by the low-tech …rm. The asymmetry in
market structure is explained by the asymmetry in the two …rms’ technology.
However, the trade cost or tari¤ jumping argument prevails: For any given
technological gap c, an increase in t increases the pro…tability of FDI. We
can summarize the results of Scenario 1 as:4
Lemma 1 In the absence of spillovers, the high-tech …rm is more inclined
to choose FDI than the low-tech …rm. An increase in the technology gap
increases the pro…tability of FDI for the technological leader and reduces the
pro…tability of FDI for the technologically weaker …rm. An increase in trade
costs increases the pro…tability of FDI for both …rms.
4The proofs of the lemmas and propositions draw on the …gures and the underlying
pro…t functions. The mathematics is laid out in the appendix.
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3.2 Scenario 2. The no-mobility case
Consider now the case of spillovers. Assume that spillovers are complete in
the sense that if the low-tech …rm produces at the same location as the high-
tech …rm, it closes the technological gap completely (¸ = 1). We analyze …rst
the case where the mobility of technology between di¤erent plants within a
…rm is prohibitively expensive (¹ = 0) and then, in Scenario 3, look at how
allowing for full mobility (¹ = 1) a¤ects the market outcome. Figure 2 shows
the market outcome in Scenario 2.
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Figure 2: Scenario 2
Clearly, comparing …gures 1 and 2 we see that the presence of spillovers
complicates the market structure. Again, if both …rms have identical tech-
nologies (c = 0), the switch from exporting to FDI takes place at t = 0:25 for
both …rms. However, if technologies di¤er, and in the presence of spillovers,
the high-tech …rm is no longer the more likely FDI candidate. Our main
message is, however, that while there is a strong incentive for technology
sourcing FDI by the low-tech …rm, strategic investment by the technological
leader may induce the low-tech …rm not to choose FDI.
Let us …rst analyze the situation with simultaneous moves in the invest-
ment game. The i-curve shows combinations of t and c for which …rm a is
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indi¤erent between exporting and investing, given that the low-tech …rm has
chosen investment. Above this curve a chooses investment, below it exports.
Firm a’s choice of entry mode given that b has chosen exports is trivial: It
also chooses exports in order not to given away its technological advantage.
The iv-curve shows combinations of t and c for which the low-tech …rm
is indi¤erent between investing and exporting, given that the high-tech …rm
chooses exports; to the right of it the low-tech …rm chooses investment and
to the left of it exports. Above the iii-line, given by t = 0:25, the dominant
strategy of the low-tech …rm is investment. Clearly, since we are to the right
of the iv-line, exports by a induces investment by b. To see why an investment
by a also results in investment by b, consider Scenario 1. From that scenario
we know that without a technology gap, both …rms choose FDI for t > 0:25.
But if a invests in market B, technological di¤erences between the two …rms
would indeed be eliminated. Hence, we know that for t > 0:25 …rm b chooses
FDI, irrespective of the choice of entry mode of its rival.
The incentive for technology sourcing increases with the technology gap.
An increase in c makes …rm b more inclined to choose FDI because there
is more to learn. At the same time, an increase in c makes …rm a less
inclined to choose FDI because by doing so it gives away a larger technological
advantage. This …nding can be summarized as:
Lemma 2 With spillovers and technological di¤erences, the market outcome
may be one in which the low-tech …rm chooses FDI and the high-tech …rm
chooses exports. The range of trade costs for which this market structure is
an equilibrium increases with the initial technology gap.
On the x¤-line …rm b is indi¤erent between keeping its home-plant active
and closing it down, given that it has made an investment abroad. Marginal
sales costs from sales from its foreign plant to its home-market B are simply
t, which should be compared to marginal production costs of c in the home-
plant. Hence, as long as t > c, demand in B is supplied by its local plant,
and if t < c, i.e., to the right of the x¤-line, all production by b takes place
in its foreign plant, with market B supplied by exports. The relocation case,
that is, FDI accompanied by a closing down of the home-plant, is indicated
by I ¤.
Lemma 3 When trade costs are lower than the di¤erence in marginal pro-
duction costs between the low-tech …rm’s home and foreign plant, the …rm
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will close down its home plant and service the home market by exports from
its foreign plant.
Let us now turn to the case with sequential moves at the investment stage,
with the high-tech …rm acting as …rst mover.5 From the discussion above we
know that the relevant area in which strategic investment may take place is
between the curves iii and iv. Above iii, the dominant strategy of …rm b is
investment, and hence …rm a cannot a¤ect the entry choice of its rival. To
the left of iv, the dominant strategy of …rm a is exports, so investment by b
would never take place in that area.
The shaded area in Figure 2 constitutes a region of parameter values
where the high-tech …rm engages in strategic FDI. The strategic investment
choice is the result of a trade-o¤ between certain costs and bene…ts. Firm
a faces two types of costs associated with strategic investment. First, an
investment in B involves a …xed cost F . Second, by investing in country B
the high-tech …rm also sacri…ces its technological superiority. Note that in
the absence of technological mobility, an investment by the low-tech …rm only
improves its technology in the foreign plant. By investing in B, the high-
tech …rm allows its rival to upgrade the technology on all its sales. Recall,
however, that to the right of the x¤-line …rm b can upgrade the technology
on all its sales by investing in A and closing down its plant in B.
These costs must be weighed against a’s gains from strategic FDI. By
investing in country B, …rm a induces the low-tech …rm not to invest in
A. Thus, the low-tech …rm continues to export to A and, by doing so, has
to carry the trade costs associated with exporting. This makes it a weaker
competitor in A and increases the pro…ts of the high-tech …rm in a’s home
market. This trade-o¤ is visualized by the v-curve. Above the v-curve,
the high-tech …rm favors strategic FDI in order to induce the low-tech …rm
not to invest in A. Below it, the high-tech …rm chooses exports, knowing
that the response of the low-tech …rm is FDI. The v-curve is upward sloping
until it meets the x¤-curve because an increase in the initial technology gap c
makes it less attractive for the high-tech …rm to allow its rival to upgrade the
technology on all its sales, and therefore makes investing in B less pro…table
for a. Beyond the x¤-curve, this trade-o¤ no longer applies, and the v-curve
is a straight line. The reason is that the alternative to strategic investment,
5 It can be shown that if the low-tech …rm were the …rst mover, the subgame perfect
equilibrium would be identical to the Nash-equilibrium in the simultaneous investment
game described above.
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namely that b invests in A, would also allow b to upgrade its technology on
all its sales, since here, b would only operate from its foreign plant. This
discussion can be summarized as:
Proposition 1 The high-tech …rm can choose strategic FDI to prevent tech-
nology sourcing FDI by its rival …rm. Strategic investment is a subgame
perfect equilibrium for ”medium” levels of trade costs.
What are the implications of strategic investment for the low-tech …rm?
On the one hand, the low-tech …rm dislikes to have its competitor located
in its home market B. The bene…ts to b are of two kinds. First, compared
to technology sourcing, the low-tech …rm saves …xed costs F . Second, with
the local presence of the high-tech …rm, …rm b can employ the better tech-
nology on all its sales. The dotted vi-curve in Figure 2 illustrates the critical
combination of trade costs and technology gap for which the low-tech …rm
is indi¤erent between the high-tech …rm choosing strategic FDI or not; to
the right of the vi-curve …rm b prefers investment by the high-tech …rm and
to the left of it exports. This curve has a positive slope because a larger
technology gap increases the e¤ective spillovers from an investment by the
high-tech …rm, which bene…ts …rm b, whereas higher trade costs makes it
relatively more pro…table for the low-tech …rm to keep its rival at a distance.
Hence, in the shaded area and to the right of the vi-curve, both …rms
prefer (I;X) to (X; I) implying that both …rms would like the high-tech …rm
to be the …rst mover at the investment stage of the game. To the left of the
dotted curve, however, there is a con‡ict of interest between the …rms, with
both …rms wanting to be the …rst mover. This discussion can be summarized
as follows:
Proposition 2 Strategic investment by the high-tech …rm is not necessarily
bad for the low-tech …rm. The bene…t for the low-tech …rm increases with the
technology gap and falls with trade costs.
3.3 Scenario 3. The full mobility case
Let us now assume that technologies can be transferred costlessly from the
more advanced to the less advanced plant within a …rm, i.e., ¹ = 1. Figure
3 shows the market outcomes in scenario 3.
Figure 3 shows that the market outcomes are less complex in this scenario
compared to the previous one. The reason is basically that with perfect
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technological mobility, if one …rm invests, the two …rms will operate with
identical technology everywhere. Contrast this with Scenario 2, where an
investment by b in A has no impact on the technology of its countryB plant.
In the full mobility case, if b sets up a plant in A, it can transfer the spillovers
back to its home plant and thus become a technologically equal competitor
in both markets.
Naturally, with full mobility the incentive for the low-tech …rm to actively
source the technology is larger than in the no mobility case. We can see this
in Figure 3 in that the iv-curve, i.e., the curve along which b is indi¤erent
between exporting and investing given exports by a, has moved to the left.
However, as will become evident, the incentive for the high-tech …rm to
engage in strategic investment is also larger. In the no mobility case, one
disadvantage of FDI for the high-tech …rm was that it had to give up its
technological superiority completely. In the full mobility case, this motive
for not investing in B is no longer there. The i-curve is therefore a straight
line. Above it, the dominant strategy of both …rms is investment.
Note also that decommissioning of b’s home-plant is not an issue here. The
reason is simply that once b has invested in A, in a world of perfect mobility
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of technology it can costlessly apply this technology to all its plants.
With simultaneous moves at the investment stage, the Nash equilibrium is
characterized by (X;X) to the left of the iv-curve, (I; I) above the i-line, and
(X; I) below i and to the right of iv. There is room for strategic investment
only in the area characterized by (X; I) in Nash equilibrium. In this area,
given that the high-tech …rm makes the …rst move at the investment stage,
it chooses investment above the v-curve, illustrated by the shaded area of
Fiure 3, and exports below it.
Proposition 3 Technological mobility increases the pro…tability of technol-
ogy sourcing FDI for the low-tech …rm, but also strengthens the motive for
the high-tech …rm to undertake strategic FDI.
In contrast to Scenario 2, strategic investment by a always results in lower
pro…ts for b compared to what b could get by itself investing in B. The reason
is basically that when one …rm invests, both …rms will be entirely similar.
Hence, if a is better o¤ by investing relative to choosing exports, the same
must be true for …rm b. There are therefore con‡icting interests in the entire
shaded area. We can state this as:
Proposition 4 Technological mobility makes strategic investment by the high-
tech …rm less attractive for the low-tech …rm.
3.4 Scenario 4. Di¤erent levels of spillovers
We have seen that the incentive for foreign direct investment by the low-
tech …rm is weak in the absence of spillovers (Scenario 1) and strong with
full spillovers (Scenarios 2 and 3). Similarly, strategic investment by a is
not an issue in the absence of spillovers, but may be strong in the presence
of spillovers. In the present scenario we investigate more closely how the
degree of spillovers a¤ects the market outcome. For this purpose, we …x the
technology gap, and consider the interplay between trade costs and spillovers.
More precisely, let c = 0:2 and assume full technological mobility (¹ = 1).
We limit the graph to levels of trade costs below t · 0:3 so that exporting is
always a pro…table strategy for the low-tech …rm even if it does not get any
spillovers. Figure 4 illustrates the market outcome.
The iv-curve divides the …gure into two quite di¤erent regions. As before,
this curve denotes parameter constellations where the low-tech …rm is indif-
ferent between exporting and investing given that the high-tech …rm exports.
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Note that with a technology gap of c = 0:2 …rm b would never invest from a
trade cost or tari¤ jumping perspective (see Figure 1). Thus, the motive for
an investment by b would be technology sourcing. To the left of the iv-curve,
the spillovers are too small to trigger technology sourcing investment. In
this area, the …gure resembles scenario 1. Indeed, for ¸ = 0, the situation
is exactly as in scenario 1, with c = 0:2. With low spillovers and low trade
costs, the equilibrium market structure is (X;X). Along the ii-curve, a is
indi¤erent between investment and exports given that b has chosen exports,
the choice of a being I above the ii-curve and X below it. The ii-curve in-
creases with ¸ because larger spillovers make it less attractive for a to invest,
thereby giving away part of its technological advantage.
To the right of the iv-curve, spillovers are large enough for technology
sourcing to be pro…table. Here, …rm b chooses investment given that a chooses
exports. This curve falls as ¸ goes up, simply because an increase in spillovers
makes it more pro…table for b to invest in order to acquire the more advanced,
foreign technology. The i-curve denotes combinations of t and ¸ where the
high-tech …rm a is indi¤erent between the two entry modes, given that b
has chosen investment. It is upward sloping because a’s market share in the
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foreign market, and thus the relative attractiveness of FDI, is decreasing in
the level of spillovers. Below the i-curve the Nash equilibrium is (X; I).
Along the iii-curve …rm b is indi¤erent between exporting and investing,
given that a has chosen investment. The iii-curve rises as ¸ falls, since
a reduction in spillovers reduces the e¢ciency of …rm b, thus reducing its
equilibrium market shares and thereby b’s incentive to invest. Above the
iii-curve, the Nash equilibrium is given by (I; I ).
Consider now the area above the i-curve, to the right of the iv-curve and
to the left of the iii-curve. Here, …rm a chooses I given that b also chooses
I. But if a chooses I, b’s best response is X. And if b chooses X , a’s best
response is also X, which triggers I from b, to which a responds with I, and
so on. Hence, in this area there exists no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Turning to the case of sequential moves and, therefore, allowing for the
possibility of strategic investment, the v-curve denotes combinations of ¸
and t along which …rm a is indi¤erent between choosing investment, the
response of b being exports, and choosing exports followed by investment
by b. Above the v-curve, …rm a …nds it pro…table to engage in strategic
investment in order to deter market entry by its low-tech competitor. The
shaded area of Figure 4 illustrates parameter values for which the subgame
perfect equilibrium is characterized by strategic investment.
The v-curve falls with a reduction in ¸, which means that a reduction in
spillovers increases the incentive for strategic investment. This might sound
counterintuitive, but note that when spillovers decrease, the high-tech …rm
does not loose all of its technological superiority when investing in the foreign
market. Thus, strategic investment is less costly, thereby making it a more
attractive alternative for the high-tech …rm. However, if spillovers reach a
certain threshold, given by the iv-curve, the incentive for the low-tech …rm
to engage in technology sourcing FDI disappears, and with it the incentive
for strategic FDI.
Proposition 5 A minimum level of spillovers is required for technology sourc-
ing and strategic FDI.
4 Conclusion
Technological di¤erences between …rms may induce technology sourcing FDI.
This is a well established fact in the theoretical and empirical literature. In
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this paper we show that a more advanced …rm may have the motive and the
ability to deter technology sourcing by strategically investing in the home
market of the less advanced …rm. The paper thus shows that the existence
of spillovers not necessarily discourages technological leaders from foreign
investment. Instead, spillovers can even promote FDI by the technological
leader, strategically employed to deter investment by its less advanced rival
…rm.
To bring out the results with maximum clarity, we have chosen the sim-
plest model possible, involving only two …rms, linear costs and demand, etc.
However, the results of the model are fairly intuitive, and we are con…dent
that mechanisms that drive the results would apply also in more complex
modeling frameworks.
In addition to demonstrating the possibility of strategic investment, we
also investigate how the equilibrium market structure is a¤ected by the nature
of spillovers. First, we show that spillovers have to exceed a certain thresh-
old before technology sourcing becomes pro…table. Below this threshold,
spillovers generally discourage FDI since the high-tech …rm choose exports
in order to prevent its technology from being copied by the rival …rm. But
once spillovers exceed this threshold, they create a complex game, character-
ized by technology sourcing FDI and strategic FDI. Second, we demonstrate
that the incentives for both technology sourcing FDI and strategic FDI are
larger if the technology acquired through spillovers is easily transferable be-
tween plants. Third, our model shows that if the mobility of spillovers is low,
the low-tech …rm may have an incentive to relocate its entire production to
the high-tech location.
The model is su¢ciently simple to allow extensions in various directions.
We limit ourselves to suggesting one possibility. Throughout the paper we
have assumed that the high-tech …rm does not have any options to prevent
spillovers. However, the literature considers varies options, depending on the
nature of the spillovers. For instance, Glass and Saggi (1999) and Fosfuri,
Motta and Rønde (2001) discuss the possibility of paying higher wages to
prevent labor turnover. In our model, one way to reduce spillovers would be
to allow the high-tech …rm to optimally choose the technology with which to
enter the low-tech market. Let ~c be the marginal costs of the high-tech …rm
in the foreign market. The high-tech …rm can then choose to enter the foreign
market with any technology ranging from state-of-the-art technology (~c = 0)
to low-tech (~c = c), so that ~c 2 [0; c]. If 0 < ~c < c, the high-tech …rm accepts
a lower cost advantage over the low-tech …rm in order to reduce the amount
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of spillovers. The pro…t maximizing choice of ~c would be where the low-tech
…rm is exactly indi¤erent between exporting and investing. It would thus give
away enough spillovers to deter technology sourcing investment, but maintain
a technological advantage over its competitor in its own home market (even
in the full mobility case). This additional option makes strategic FDI even
more attractive for the high-tech …rm and enlarges the spectrum of parameter
constellations that support strategic FDI.
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Appendix
De…ne ¦iKJ as pro…ts of …rm i = a; b when …rm a chooses strategy K
and …rm b chooses J , where K; J 2 (X; I; 0). For each player there are four
possible payo¤s involving entry.6 For …rm b these are (with the …rst term on
the right hand side denoting operating pro…ts in market A and the second
term operating pro…ts in market B):
¦bXX =
1
9
(1¡ 2 (c+ t))2+ 1
9
(1¡ 2c+ t)2 .
¦bIX =
1
9
(1¡ 2 ((1¡ ¸) c+ t))2+ 1
9
(1¡ 2 (1¡ ¸) c)2 .
¦bXI =
1
9
(1¡ 2 (1 ¡ ¸)c)2 + 1
9
(1 ¡ 2 (¹ (1 ¡ ¸) c+ (1¡ ¹) c) + t)2 ¡F .
¦bII =
1
9
(1¡ 2 (1 ¡ ¸)c)2 + 1
9
(1¡ 2 (1 ¡ ¸)c)2 ¡ F .
Note that if …rm b invests and decides to close down its domestic plant
and service the home market from its plant abroad, the relevant pro…ts would
be given by:
¦bXI¤ =
1
9
(1¡ 2 (1¡ ¸) c)2 + 1
9
(1¡ 2 ((1¡ ¸) c+ t) + t)2 ¡ F .
Similarly, payo¤s for a are:
¦aXX =
1
9
(1 + (c+ t))2 +
1
9
(1¡ 2t+ c)2 .
6Pro…table entry for …rm i requires non-negative operating pro…ts, which from (2)
implies si · 12 (1 + sj ), i 6= j .
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¦aIX =
1
9
(1 + ((1¡ ¸)c + t))2 + 1
9
(1 + (1 ¡ ¸)c)2 ¡ F .
¦aXI =
1
9 (1 + (1¡ ¸) c)
2 +
1
9 (1¡ 2t+ (¹ (1 ¡¸)c + (1 ¡ ¹) c))
2 .
¦aII =
1
9
(1 + (1 ¡ ¸)c)2 + 1
9
(1 + (1¡ ¸) c)2 ¡ F .
¦aXI¤ =
1
9
(1 + (1¡ ¸) c)2 + 1
9
(1 ¡ 2t+ ((1 ¡ ¸)c + t))2 .
The curves in the Figures are given by equating the following payo¤s:
i : ¦aXI = ¦aII.
ii : ¦aXX = ¦
a
IX.
iii : ¦bIX = ¦
b
II .
iv : ¦bXX = ¦bXI , if (1 ¡ ¹) ¸c < t.
iv : ¦bXX = ¦
b
XI¤ , if (1¡ ¹) ¸c > t.
v : ¦aXI = ¦aIX , if (1 ¡ ¹) ¸c < t.
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v : ¦aXI¤ = ¦
a
IX , if (1 ¡ ¹) ¸c > t.
vi : ¦bXI = ¦bIX .
The no-entry condition in …gure 1 is derived by
x : ¼bA = 0.
The relocation condition in …gure 2 is derived by
x¤ : ¼¤bB = ¼bB,
where ¼¤bB denotes …rm b pro…ts from sales to market B when b is located
in market A.
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More detailed appendix (for referee):
Scenario 1
Parameter settings: F = 112, ¸ = ¹ = 0
The ii-curve:
¦aXX = 19 (1 + (c + t))
2 + 19 (1 ¡ 2t + c)2
¦aIX = 19 (1 + ((1¡ 0) c+ t))2 + 19 (1 + (1¡ 0) c)2 ¡ 112
¦aXX = ¦aIX : Solution is :
n
t = 12 +
1
2 c¡ 14
p
(1 + 8c+4c2)
o
The iii-curve:
¦bIX = 19 (1¡ 2 ((1¡ 0) c+ t))2 + 19 (1 ¡ 2 (1 ¡ 0) c)2
¦bII =
1
9 (1¡ 2 (1 ¡ 0) c)2 + 19 (1¡ 2 (1¡ 0) c)2 ¡ 112
¦bIX = ¦bII : Solution is :
n
t = 12 ¡ c ¡ 14
p
(16c2 ¡ 16c+ 1)
o
The x-curve:
¼bA = 19 (1¡ 2 (c+ t))2
¼bA = 0, Solution is :
©
t = 12 ¡ c
ª
Scenario 2
Parameter settings: F = 112, ¸ = 1, ¹ = 0
The i-curve:
¦aXI = 19 (1 + (1¡ 1) c)2 + 19 (1¡ 2t+ (0(1 ¡ 1) c+ (1¡ 0) c))2
¦aII = 19 (1 + (1¡ 1) c)2 + 19 (1 + (1 ¡ 1)c)2 ¡ 112
¦aXI = ¦aII, Solution is:
©
t = 12c+
1
4
ª
The iii-curve:
¦bIX = 19 (1¡ 2 ((1¡ 1) c+ t))2 + 19 (1 ¡ 2 (1 ¡ 1) c)2
¦bII = 19 (1¡ 2 (1 ¡ 1) c)2 + 19 (1¡ 2 (1¡ 1) c)2 ¡ 112
¦bIX = ¦bII, Solution is:
©
t = 14
ª
The iv-curve:
¦bXX = 19 (1 ¡ 2 (c+ t))2 + 19 (1¡ 2c+ t)2
¦bXI =
1
9 (1¡ 2 (1¡ 1) c)2 + 19 (1 ¡ 2 (0 (1¡ 1) c+ (1¡ 0)c) + t)2 ¡ 112
¦bXI¤ = 19 (1¡ 2 (1¡ 1)c)2 + 19 (1 ¡ 2 ((1¡ 1) c+ t) + t)2 ¡ 112
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¦bXX = ¦bXI, if (1¡ 0) 1c < t, Solution is:
©
t = ¡c+ 14
ª
¦bXX = ¦bXI¤ , if (1¡ 0)1c > t,
Solution is:
n
t = ¡12c+ 14
p
(¡28c2 ¡ 3 + 32c)
o
The v-curve:
¦aIX =
1
9 (1 + ((1¡ 1) c+ t))2 + 19 (1 + (1¡ 1) c)2 ¡ 112
¦aXI = 19 (1 + (1¡ 1) c)2 + 19 (1¡ 2t+ (0(1 ¡ 1) c+ (1¡ 0) c))2
¦aXI¤ = 19 (1 + (1¡ 1) c)2 + 19 (1¡ 2t+ ((1¡ 1)c + t))2
¦aXI = ¦aIX , if (1¡ ¹) ¸c < t,
Solution is:
n
t = 23 c+ 1¡ 16
p
(4c2 + 24c +27)
o
¦aXI¤ = ¦aIX, if (1 ¡ ¹) ¸c > t, Solution is:
©
t = 316
ª
The vi-curve:
¦bIX = 19 (1¡ 2 ((1¡ 1) c+ t))2 + 19 (1 ¡ 2 (1 ¡ 1) c)2
¦bXI = 19 (1¡ 2 (1¡ 1) c)2 + 19 (1 ¡ 2 (0 (1¡ 1) c+ (1¡ 0)c) + t)2 ¡ 112
¦bIX = ¦bXI , Solution is:
n
t = 1¡ 23c¡ 16
p
(27¡ 96c+ 64c2)
o
The x¤-curve:
¼bB = 19 (1¡ 2 (0 (1¡ 1) c+ (1¡ 0) c) + t)2
¼¤bB = 19 (1¡ 2 ((1¡ 1)c + t) + t)2
¼¤bB = ¼bB, Solution is: ft = cg
Scenario 3
Parameter settings: F = 112, ¸ = ¹ = 1
The i-curve:
¦aXI = 19 (1 + (1¡ 1) c)2 + 19 (1¡ 2t+ (1(1 ¡ 1) c+ (1¡ 1) c))2
¦aII = 19 (1 + (1¡ 1) c)2 + 19 (1 + (1 ¡ 1)c)2 ¡ 112
¦aXI = ¦aII, Solution is:
©
t = 14
ª
The iv-curve:
¦bXX = 19 (1 ¡ 2 (c+ t))2 + 19 (1¡ 2c+ t)2
¦bXI =
1
9 (1¡ 2 (1¡ 1) c)2 + 19 (1 ¡ 2 (1 (1¡ 1) c+ (1¡ 1)c) + t)2 ¡ 112
¦bXX = ¦bXI, Solution is:
n
t = 12 ¡ 12c ¡ 14
p
(1 + 24c¡ 28c2)
o
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The v-curve:
¦aIX = 19 (1 + ((1¡ 1) c+ t))2 + 19 (1 + (1¡ 1) c)2 ¡ 112
¦aXI = 19 (1 + (1¡ 1) c)2 + 19 (1¡ 2t+ (1(1 ¡ 1) c+ (1¡ 1) c))2
¦aIX = ¦aXI , Solution is:
©
t = 1 ¡ 12
p
3
ª
Scenario 4
Parameter settings: F = 112, c =
1
5 , ¹ = 1
The i-curve:
¦aXI =
1
9
¡
1 + (1 ¡ ¸) 15
¢2+ 19 ¡1¡ 2t+ ¡1 (1¡ ¸) 15 + (1¡ 1) 15¢¢2
¦aII =
1
9
¡
1 + (1¡ ¸) 15
¢2 + 19 ¡1 + (1¡ ¸) 15¢2 ¡ 112
¦aXI = ¦aII, Solution is:
n
t = 35 ¡ 110¸ ¡ 120
q¡
69 ¡ 48¸ +4¸2¢o
The ii-curve:
¦aXX = 19
¡
1 +
¡
1
5 + t
¢¢2 + 19 ¡1¡ 2t+ 15¢2
¦aIX = 19
¡
1 +
¡
(1¡ ¸) 15 + t
¢¢2 + 19 ¡1 + (1 ¡ ¸) 15¢2 ¡ 112
¦aXX = ¦aIX , Solution is:
n
t = 35 ¡ 120¸ ¡ 120
q¡
69¡ 120¸+ 9¸2¢o
The iii-curve:
¦bIX = 19
¡
1 ¡ 2¡(1 ¡ ¸)¡15¢+ t¢¢2 + 19 ¡1¡ 2 (1¡ ¸) ¡15¢¢2
¦bII = 19
¡
1¡ 2 (1¡ ¸) ¡15¢¢2+ 19 ¡1¡ 2 (1¡ ¸) ¡15¢¢2 ¡ 112
¦bIX = ¦bII, Solution is:
n
t = 310 +
1
5¸ ¡ 120
q¡¡39 + 48¸ +16¸2¢o
The iv-curve:
¦bXX = 19
¡
1¡ 2¡¡15¢ + t¢¢2+ 19 ¡1¡ 2 ¡15¢ + t¢2
¦bXI =
1
9
¡
1 ¡ 2 (1¡ ¸) ¡15¢¢2+ 19 ¡1¡ 2 ¡1 (1¡ ¸) ¡15¢ + (1¡ 1)¡15¢¢ + t¢2¡
1
12
¦bXX = ¦bXI, Solution is:
n
t = 310 +
1
10¸ ¡ 120
q¡¡39 + 120¸ + 36¸2¢o
The v-curve:
¦aIX = 19
¡
1 +
¡
(1¡ ¸) ¡15¢ + t¢¢2 + 19 ¡1 + (1¡ ¸) ¡15¢¢2 ¡ 112
¦aXI = 19
¡
1 + (1 ¡ ¸)¡15¢¢2 + 19 ¡1¡ 2t+ ¡1 (1 ¡ ¸)¡15¢+ (1 ¡ 1) ¡15¢¢¢2
¦aIX = ¦aXI , Solution is:
n
t = 65 ¡ 15¸ ¡ 110
q¡
119¡ 48¸+ 4¸2¢o
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